We offer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies individual demands globally. Moreover, under observation of only a subset of the equilibrium manifold, we find domains on which aggregate and individual demands are identifiable. Our argument avoids the assumption of Balasko (2004) requiring the observation of the complete manifold.
Introduction
We offer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies individual demands. 1 This same result has previously been obtained by Balasko (2004) , Chiappori et al. (2004) and Matzkin (2005) . Balasko's result has been criticized for its assumption that equilibrium prices are observed for situations in which the incomes of all individuals but one are zero. Under regularity assumptions, Chiappori et al. obtain local identification of individual demands using local knowledge of the manifold. Balasko, however, has claimed that the argument given by Chiappori et al. implicitly requires that preferences be analytic. Matzkin determines the largest class of fundamentals for which identification is possible.
We use Balasko's idea on how to recover the aggregate demand function from the equilibrium manifold, and hence avoid Chiappori et al.'s usage of the implicit function and the Cartan-Kaehler theorems. We then use a slightly different argument than Chiappori et al. to identify individual demands from the aggregate demand function, so we also avoid Balasko's observational assumption.
The Model
Consider a profile of utility functions
, where I = {1, ..., I} is a finite set of agents (a society) and L ≥ 2 is the number of commodities. Notice that we maintain strictly positive endowments and that the equilibrium manifold allows for variations in the aggregate endowment. In Balasko's argument, behavior at null endowments is used, unlike here. In Chiappori et al. the assumption of the observation of a relatively open subset of the equilibrium manifold implies that the aggregate endowment is allowed to vary as well: their argument allows for perturbations to each agent's endowments, keeping prices and the endowments of other consumers fixed (see Carvajal et al., 2004) .
Henceforth, we maintain the assumption that there is a profile ¡ u i ¢ i∈I that satisfies condition 1, and assume that some subset of its equilibrium manifold, M, is observed. We study whether unobserved fundamentals can be uniquely determined from that subset. We do not test the existence of profile
Our results generalize Balasko's theorem showing that M uniquely and globally determines aggregate demand F . We also consider the case in which only a subset of M is observed and show that identification of F over a subset of its domain is possible. Then, we show that F uniquely determines individual demands ¡ f i ¢ i∈I . That is, we prove identification of individual demands from the equilibrium manifold. It then follows from MasColell (1977) that individual preferences can also be identified. 2 
From the Equilibrium Manifold to Aggregate Demand
Under our assumptions, it is well known that F is continuous and satisfies that
and that each f i satisfies Walras's law. For any Φ : S
and (
If in the previous definition we drop the requirement that Φ be continuous, then we say that E strongly identifies F over D. Clearly, strong identification implies identification.
Intuitively, we say that E identifies F over D if, for any function that cannot be ruled out as aggregate demand function, we have that, on the restricted domain D, that function is identical to the true aggregate demand function. A function cannot be ruled out as aggregate demand function when (i) it satisfies the properties that are necessary for it to be an aggregate demand, and (ii) it is consistent with the observed data (because all the observed equilibria are equilibrium according to it).
We say that the equilibrium manifold identifies (strongly identifies) aggregate demand globally if M identifies (strongly identifies) F over S
It is straightforward that the equilibrium manifold identifies aggregate demand globally if and only if F 2 The literature on integrability studies conditions under which it is possible to construct preferences that rationalize a given demand function. It does not tell us when the preferences that rationalize a demand function are unique, which MasColell (1977) does.
is the only continuous function Φ :
In the case of global identification, every function that satisfies the properties of an aggregate demand can be ruled out, with the exception of the true aggregate demand.
Some properties of the concept of identification (strong identification) are straightforward.
Suppose that E and e E identify F over D and e D, respectively, and suppose that
e Finally, suppose further that Φ is continuous and
. If E identifies F over D, it follows that for every n ∈ N, Φ (p n , w n ) = F (p n , w n ), and then, by continuity, Φ (p, w) = F (p, w).
The key result is the following theorem, which generalizes the idea of Balasko.
Theorem 2 Let E ⊆ M, and define
Proof. By theorem 1, parts 2 and 5, it suffices to show that E strongly identifies F over
Corollary 1 (Balasko) The equilibrium manifold strongly identifies aggregate demand globally.
Proof. It suffices to show that for each
++ . The result follows by Walras's Law and the fact that, then, b
Proof. It suffices to show that for each
The largest domain on which, given E ⊆ M, strong identification is possible, is determined next.
Suppose that there is (p, w) ∈ D\D E . Then, by definition, Φ 2 (p, w) =
Identification, however, requires a more involved argument, which assumes compactness of E. We present that argument in Appendix A1. This theorem determines the largest restriction of the domain over which identification of aggregate demand is possible. The "dual" question of how small a subset of the manifold can be if it is to allow for identification of the aggregate demand over a given subset of its domain, which is of lesser empirical relevance, is dealt with in Appendix A2.
Theorem 4 If
Proof. See Appendix A1.
From Aggregate Demand to Individual Demands
If, contrary to our assumption, equilibrium prices are observable for situations in which the incomes of all individuals but one are zero, the argument above still holds and then it is straightforward that aggregate demand identifies individual demands: for all i, f i (p, w i ) = F (p, (0, 0, ..., w i , ..., 0)). That argument, however, has been criticized by Chiappori et al. (2004) : if observation of situations in which the endowments of all consumers but one are pegged at zero is possible, then the section of the manifold at that boundary is that one consumer's inverse demand. In our case, an immediate argument for identification of individual demands can obviously still be made by taking sequences of endowments that converge to zero for all individuals but one, for whom the endowment is kept constant, 3 but that argument would fail when, for example, only M K is observed. We now show that, under an additional assumption, one can identify individual demands, without resorting to boundary analysis. Our proof is somewhat similar to the one presented by Chiappori et al., but simpler in the sense that it does not need to invoke the CartanKaehler theorem. As a consequence, for us it suffices that only the first few derivatives of the demand exist, so analyticity is not required.
For the sake of simplicity, we initially study the global setting introduced in the previous section. The case in which the aggregate demand is not globally known is presented afterwards.
The global case:
In this case, we can weaken Chiappori et al.'s regularity assumption as follows:
and is differentiably strictly concave, and for every p ∈ S L−1 ++ , there exist w ∈ R L ++ , and l, l 0 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1}, such that
The previous condition is weaker not only because of the lower degree of differentiability required, but also because w only needs an existential, and not a universal, quantifier. The condition is indeed restrictive as it requires, for example, that income effects do not vanish. It also requires that there be at least three commodities. Intuitively, the condition requires that preferences be "complex enough" so as to generate the independence of income effects. As Chiappori et al. have pointed out, it suffices that individual demands have rank at least two for the condition to be met everywhere. Appendix A3, at the end of the paper, illustrates the point.
Under condition 2, each
and further satisfies Slutsky symmetry.
We say that aggregate demand globally identifies individual demands if, given F ,
, satisfying Walras's law and Slutsky symmetry, and such that P i∈I ϕ i = F .
Theorem 5 Aggregate demand identifies individual demands.
¢¢ i∈I satisfy Walras's law and Slutsky symmetry and be such that F = P i∈I ϕ i . Fix i ∈ I and define θ i : (1, 1, . .., w, ..., 1)), where w occupies the i th position, and γ i (p) = − P j∈I\{i} ϕ j (p, 1).
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By Slutsky symmetry, for every l, l 0 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1}, everywhere in S
By regularity, for some
whereas, for every other l 00 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1}, by Slutsky symmetry,
and, by Walras's law, γ 
It follows that
¡ ϕ i ¢ I i=1 = ¡ f i ¢ I i=1 .
Restricted observation
It must be noticed that the choice of ¡ w j ¢ j∈I\{i} = (1) j∈I\{i} in the proof of theorem 5 is arbitrary and that in the local case, or when only F |D is available, such choice can be modified as needed.
In the case in which only M K has been observed, and hence F has been identified only over D K , condition 2 needs to be strengthened to require that p · w > K. If only local information of F is available, one must strengthen the second part of the assumption so that the profile of endowments at which the condition is met lies in the observed domain. In any case, C 4 still suffices. For the sake of simplicity, assume that we strengthen condition 2 by substituting the existential quantifier of w by the universal quantifier.
Let
and Slutsky symmetry, and such that (
Intuitively, we say that
if, for any profile of functions that cannot be ruled out as individual demands, we have that, on the restricted domains ¡ D i ¢ i∈I , those functions are identical to the true demand functions. A profile of functions cannot be ruled out as individual demands when (i) it satisfies the properties that are necessary for a profile of individual demands, and (ii) it is consistent with the observed data (because at all observed prices and endowments, the aggregate of the functions equals the observed aggregate demand).
, satisfying Walras's law and Slutsky symmetry, and such that for every (p, w) ∈ D, 
for all i. Since E is compact, we can take a convergent subsequence
, it follows that p · w = p · b w.
With the previous lemma, we can simply prove that D ⊆ D E , as follows:
Since, by the lemma, D E is closed, we know that for some δ > 0,
c , where
++ . Define the following sets:
where for each i,
Since E is compact, K and, hence, K are closed. Similarly, K is closed.
We divide the proof in four consecutive steps.
Step 1: We first prove that 
Step 2: We now construct a function Φ. By construction, Φ is obviously continuous and satisfies Walras's law. To show that it is well defined suppose that (p, w) is such that Φ (p, w) 6 = F (p, w). By construction If B l and C l are zero then the system is of rank 1, the utility function is homothetic and clearly the regularity condition does not hold. If B 2 (p) C 3 (p) −B 2 (p) C 3 (p) 6 = 0 the system has rank at least 2. Below, we prove that, for this case, the regularity condition holds.
Restricting p to S
